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Reference to the term taste is usually accompanied by
an immediate association with the palate and it is not
until considerably later, if at all, that its very different
type of link with aesthetic emotion comes to mind. The
use of colloquial expressions in which it figures as such
does not remove the difficulty arising from its mean-
ings, which are at once so akin and at the same time so
opposed; the metaphorical juxtaposition of the appre-
ciation that such different feelings make of the sensory
reality which provokes them contributes to the prevail-
ing confusion. The etymological history of the term can
take us back to its Greek (géusis) or Latin (gustus) equiv-
alents, whose Castillian translation is the same and
comprises the action of'tasting', trying and, ultimately,
'getting to know', since, after all, getting to know is an es-
sential component of such activity. To find out if we
like something or not, we must try it, and this act of
trying entails getting to know it, because the one cannot
exist without the other. The term, however, appears to
be linked, in the first instance, to that physiological
phenomenon on which the perception of the taste of
food depends and which locates the organ charged with
such a function in the tongue.
The Physiology of Taste by E. Brillat-Savarin, publish-
ed in 1829, is the classic manual alluded to whenever
consideration is given to the effect foods have on us,
pleasing or otherwise, depending on the appreciation
we make of them. The author, in order to justify his gas-
tronomic treatise, adduces that taste is, in the last anal-
ysis, the sense that gives us most pleasure and is, at the
same time, equivalent to a kind of intelligence demon-
strable in that very refinement which animals will nev-
er acquire. These have very limited tastes, since some
will eat only vegetables, others meat, and are not pre-
disposed to the perfection of his buccal and digestive
apparatus. When the term is used to designate our opin-
ion on flavours, this does not exclude its use in reveal-
ing our impressions concerning other objects which
affect the rest of the senses. And hence we find compar-
isons like those that the Abbe Dubois was already mak-
ing, in an essay published in 1719 (Critical Reflections on
Poetry and Painting), between pleasures referring to the
aesthetic taste and those of the culinary taste. Later,
Edmund Burke himself also used such similarity in
meaning to defend the vulnerability of our senses and
thus of the conclusions they adopt. The disparity in tas-
tes, physiologically speaking, equally demonstrates the
disparity which can exist as far as aesthetic tastes are
concerned. This was an explanation for many years for
the subjective determinism which any type of sensory
knowing imposes and for the principle of relativity
which issued, naturally, from the structure of our organs.
It must be admitted that the term would be inconceiv-
able without its adherence to an experience of knowing,
to an act of knowing without attributes, which with al-
most fictitious simultaneity results in a value judgment.
This applies both to a physiological experience and to
an experience resulting from aesthetic contemplation:
in the one case, it is related to those sense organs which
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transmit ordinary sensations to the brain and, in the
other, to those senses from which proceed the causes of
all aesthetic emotion, that is to say, seeing and hearing.
It is usual in all Romance languages for preference to
be given, in the hierarchy of meanings attributable to the
word taste, to the physiological field, as if it were more
difficult to interpret and discern when linked to the aes-
thetic, so intimately dependent on the sensitivity of the
eye and the ear. From this latter dimension of the word
it is possible to assert that the action generated involves
an experience of knowing, in which there is implicit a
particular apprehension of the object, followed by a val-
ue judgment. Every experience of knowing that has its
origin in sensory reality usually entails the intervention
of the capacity of judging, which impels us to accept or
to reject that which we are proposing to try and to get to
know.
B. Croce said to good purpose that the one great
question, and the most famous, raised in the eighteenth
century stemmed from the discovery of the relativity of
taste, not only because of the implications that theori-
zing on the subject was to have in the field of the arts in
general but also because of the transcendence which
would finally succeed in imposing the liberalism de-
rived from it in the political and social spheres. In order
to develop a theory of taste, it had been necessary to
reckon with the tradition introduced by English empiri-
cal thinking and recuperate those anti-Cartesian ele-
ments to be found even in Descartes own discourse, for
example in the Treatise on Passions. Such a discovery
could only occur after the publication of Locke's Essay
Concerning Human Understanding (1666), the Historical
and Critical Dictionary (1695-97) of Pierre Bayle or the
Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds (1724) by Fonte-
nelle, to mention a few of the works which contributed
to the establishment of a new spirit. In these works
are to be found the foundations of liberty of opinion,
religious freedom and the concept of tolerance, as op-
posed not only to the tyrannies practised in the name
of the divine right of kings but also to fanaticism of all
kinds.
An analysis of human understanding from the stand-
point that this is fed initially on information brought
by the senses decides the priority of the cognizant sub-
ject and thus makes it impossible to establish any uni-
versal fixed principles or any- norms about what the
realm of the cognoscible comprises. The sensory organs
determine for Locke, and justify for all the deists and
materialists of the first half of the eighteenth century,
not only the predominance of the subject over the ob-
ject of knowledge but at the same time the circumstan-
tial nature of what is wished to be known. Our senses
can only perceive change and never what lasts: as they
are also subject to the provisional aspect of existence
itself and to its configuration, feeling cannot be freed
from this condition. La Mettrie with his «machine-man»
insists on demonstrating our similarity with the «ma-
chine-animals» of Descartes and the fact that our sen-
sations vary in accordance with the disposition of our
organs and that we consequently differ in the same
measure from our neighbours.
The relativity of worlds that exist in the universe is
made to coincide with the relativity of knowledge, pos-
tulated by English empiricists and enlightened thinkers,
and from which is derived the rejection of accepted
ideas, beliefs and prejudices in an age identified with
the crisis of the European conscience. More important
still is the repercussion this supposes in the fight for
respect for public liberties made manifest in Voltaire's
Essay on Customs and Treatise on Tolerance or even in
Swift's Gulliver's Travels. It is no accident that it is pre-
cisely in the midst of this effervescence of ideas that
there should appear the first essay on taste as such,
written by David Hume and published in 1741. Ac-
cording to this philosopher, all knowledge is based on
sensory experience, which unquestionably legitimizes
variety and differences of opinion. Perception is not the
same in all men and thus neither is sensible reality, so it
is not possible to establish norms for taste; apart from
this, no feeling exactly represents what is in the object
which gives rise to it but only indicates a certain con-
cordance or relation between the object and the organs
and faculties perceiving it.
In the last instance, for Hume, beauty cannot even be
considered as a quality of things themselves but rather
it is we who attribute it to certain objects. It is only ex-
perience that, throughout the history of humanity, can
have reconciled tastes, opinions, sensations. For it seems
that, in spite of the variety and caprices of taste, there
are certain general principles of approval or rejection
which tend to be of a universal nature. If this is not so,
how can we explain the taste of a particular period, for
example, which goes beyond individual exceptions, such
as can be discerned first in a fashion, then subsequently
in a style? Once again, the well-used symbolic parallel
between taste linked to aesthetic experience and taste
associated with the savour of food enables us to con-
template its arbitrariness and relativism, as with the
inclinations of coincident social groups in the matter of
one taste or another. Voltaire, Montesquieu and Dide-
rot, in their philosophical novels or with novelized ar-
guments, persistently defend the origin of the different
customs of men according to where they live, the me-
teorological conditions and other various circumstan-
ces which shape individuals socially.
A follower of Hume, Edmund Burke, precedes his
Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas on the Sublime and
Beauty with a short manifesto on taste, which is the di-
rect antecedent of Kant's Critique of Judgment. Burke's
essay is dated 1757 and in his introductory text, the anal-
ysis of taste is approached both from the perspective of
the subject who perceives the impression caused by cer-
tain properties or qualities of the object and from that
of these very qualities themselves, which appear to make
the object beautiful or sublime, pleasing or painful. The
famous Enquiry sets out from a physiological analysis
of the human body and from a description of the mech-
anism of the sensations in order to broach the inexis-
tence of a norm of taste. Although taste is common to
the whole human race, it is not the same in everyone,
because of circumstances which are not of our own vo-
lition. For him, taste is a kind of faculty, by means of
which we emit a judgment on a sensation of pleasure or
displeasure caused by an object. His conception of the
diversity of tastes admits a lack of limits, in both quali-
tative and quantitative senses, and maintains that the
only common starting point is first of all the similarity
of the sense organs and the hypothesis that, likewise,
what these perceive must of necessity continue to main-
tain some similarity. Hence, within the diversity there
will also be tendencies grouping individuals according
to their inclinations in matters of taste. The most obvious
coincidence, says Burke, is found in the area of basic
flavours, which custom has established, allowing little
margin for dissension. But this is not so easily applica-
ble in the case of new or unknown flavours, where great-
er tolerance is shown to the particular sensation of each
individual.
As far as taste in aesthetic objects is concerned, Bur-
ke displays the same comprehension as in his previous
analysis, introducing psychological and sociological
connotations, which intervene to modify the value judg-
ment resulting from any aesthetic experience. This in-
tervention, moreover, he believes to apply either to a
group of individuals or to each one of them individual-
1 ly. Everything Burke says about the influence of the sen-
~JQf ses on taste is a replica of the empirical arguments of
Hume. Like him, he substantiates the impossibility
of establishing norms of taste. The texts of Hume and
Burke are the immediate antecedents of that critique of
taste written by Kant and which he finally called Cri-
tique of Judgment before its publication in 1790. Kant
defines judgment of taste as aesthetic feeling; and points
out at the same time that the feeling does not refer to
the object as object of knoledge but to the subject and
to the feeling of pleasure or suffering which he expe-
riences. Kant appreciates the testimony of Burke, whom
he mentions explicitly, but alleges that his reflection
seeks to fit in with the physiological process of sensa-
tion and with certain psychological mechanisms that
act in the formation of the judgment inherent in it. Bur-
ke evades the Kantian antinomies such as that which
arises from the irreconcilability between individual taste
and universal taste, inasmuch as the former derives from
feeling and is thus inevitably subjective. Taste is for Kant
a faculty of judgment and, being a judgment of taste, it
is merely contemplative; although in another place he
alleges that taste is the discipline of genius and is a
guide as to just how far it must extend so as to remain
consistent with a particular purpose. The identification
of taste with feeling prevents it, in such a capacity, from
being a logical judgment, because it can only be aes-
thetic. Kant's comprehensive disquisition on taste invi-
tes a methodical reflection requiring far more than one
or two readings but which, in spite of its difficulty, is an
unavoidable point of reference. Its conclusion that it is
only when sensibility is reconciled with a moral sense
that genuine taste can adopt a given unchangeable form,
reveals the complexity of this text but does not make it
any the less essential.
The lack of precision in defining the limits of beauty
is a result of the establishment of the liberty sanctioned
by this conception of taste as far as it concerns an aes-
thetic judgment which has its origin in feeling: the con-
sequence is that it is impossible to lay down any norm
about what is beauty and what is not. Burke's Enquiry
itself insinuates this, as does Kant's The Beautiful and
the Sublime. This liberty attributed to the passive sub-
ject of the aesthetic perception is transferred to the ge-
nius, the subject that has created the work of art and
who is granted a faculty of productive knowledge. Lack
of definition is not uncertainty but possibility. There
exist no limits or objective rules which can decide the
representative character which the aesthetic feeling must
adopt or that emotion of the artist which he wishes to
communicate and which is in need of a form. In ex-
tending the concept of the beautiful to the sublime, both
Burke and Kant initiated the breakaway from those con-
ditions which supposedly determined beauty, such as
proportion or symmetry, without denying the need for
the parts to fit into a whole, in order for the work of art
to be organic. The sublime was understood from then
on as a particular kind of aesthetic feeling, which it
could still be argued is a variety of beauty. Burke under-
stands that beauty, in general terms, must be some qual-
ity of the bodies which act mechanically on the human
mind through the intervention of the senses. From
which he concludes that we must carefully consider
«in which way those sensitive qualities are disposed in
things such as those we find beautiful through expe-
rience».
With respect to the real cause of beauty, Burke is very
cautious, since he does not believe that it is perfection,
nor on the contrary that disproportion or deformity are
its negation. Burke, Kant and Hegel himself move to-
wards the theoretical and practical adoption on the part
of the genius of the indeterminate nature of beauty as a
working principle, and of freedom of taste. Not far dis-
tant is the agitation of ideas which fosters tolerance in
all conditions and which, on the one hand, leads to the
French Revolution, and, on the other, introduces mo-
dernity with the emergence of Romanticism. Modernity
thus owes its origin to that «free poetry» which the
Schlegel brothers baptized with the name of «modern
poetry» and, since the term seemed too generic, of «Ro-
mantic poetry». Even so, it was still some years before
that indeterminate nature of the limits of beauty was
made verbally manifest with all the poetic force and
radicalness, such as issues from these lines of Baudelaire:
«What matters it to me that you come from Hell or Heav-
en, / oh Beauty, monstrous, awesome, innocent / if your
eyes, smiling, are to open the door for me / to a longed
for infinite I never knew?» The same emotion impels
Rimbaud to make the gesture of setting beauty on his
knees and abusing it and inspires the symbolist dreams
reproduced in painting, literature and music. The histo-
ry of taste is a history of «form», but above all it must
be borne in mind that it is an experience of knowing,
whose origin resides in feeling and, as a consequence,
«form» as such depends first and foremost on internal
necessity.
